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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utal1 
MAUD D. COON and JOSEPH 




P ~ \l\1'", a corporation, 
' 
Respondent. , 
Case ~o. 7470 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTs· 
STATEMENT 
This is an action brought by lviaud D. Ccon and Joseph 
Coon, husband and wife, against the Utah Constructoin Corn-
pany, a corporation, to recover dan1ages alleged to have resulteJ 
.trom respondent's use of the highway adjacent to appellants' 
brick hon1e situate at 80th \vest and 3 3rd South Streets, Salt 
Lake County, Utah (Tr. 3). From July, 1948, and continuing 
approximately for seven months thereafter, the Utah Con-
struction Company was engaged in the construction and 
repair of a dike around the tailings pond of the Utah Copper 
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Company and in the performance of this work, the company 
used approximately fifteen Euclid trucks whose gross load 
varies·. from 81,000 to 84,000 pounds. These ·trucks are 
tquipped with pneumatic tires. The front wheels of these 
vehicles were equipped with 1200/24 tires and the rear wheels 
with 2100/24 .tires. Each unit had six tires. Respopdenfs 
Exhibit No: 12, which is a. part of. the record, is a photograph 
of a Euclid truck such as. was used on the project in question 
(Tr. 122, .123 and 124, inclusive). 
In the performance of the contract in question, these large 
Euclid trucks traversed an area of approximately seven miles 
from the place where they were loaded to the place \vhere 
th load was discharged on the dike. \Y/ ork began usually 
around 5:00 A.M. and continued throughout the day and into 
the night hours to approximately 12:00 P.M. (Tr. 8). As 
stated above, . the appellants' home, photographs of which 
appear as a part of this record, is situated near the high\vay 
~ t 80th West and 3 3rd South Streets along which these large 
Euclid trucks conveyed their loads of rock and earth materials 
to the tailings pond. 
The highway immediately tn front of appellants' hon1e 
has a-grade which requires the shifting of gears in the operation 
of the trucks in question when bearing their capacity load 
( T r. 7) . · The natural operation of the trucks .caused smoke 
ilnd fuel fumes and dust ~in large quantities, particularly when 
proceding- up· the grade adjacent to. appellants' home. The 
fumes, dust arid smoke penetrated the air and were blo,vn by 
air currents over appellants' property and into their ho1ne in 
~uch quantities and so continuously each day during the opera-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion of respondenfs business aforesaid as to tequire· the a p-~ 
peUants to keep all \vindo,vs and :doors of the home shut tight. 
Notwithst an ding the doors and windo\YS \Vere closed· tightly, 
the fumes, smoke and dust from the operation of the trucks 
~eeped through and ·penetrated. into the ·rooms of ·the hon1e 
settling upoh and covering the furniture, fixtures, carpets, 
beds, .:beddings -and··household effects and infiltrating' into th~ 
food and edibles in the appellants' home, thereby interfering: 
with the comfortable enjoyment of said home and creating 
an unhealthy and unsanitary condition in said home. In 
addition to these conditions, the operati~n of .• said trucks 
naturally caused loud and disturbing noises to such an. extent 
that appellants and appellants' family were unable to carry 
on a conversation in their home in a. normal way thereby causing 
appellants great annoyance a.nd constantly. disturbing . ~heir 
peace and quiet and the night-time operation of ·the said 
trucks made it impossible for appellants to sleep. or to obtain 
proper rest. 
In addition to the foregoing conditions creat~d ... by t~e 
operation of the trucks of the Tespondent, appellants sought 
~amages in the court below for large cracks that have developed 
and appeared in the outside walls of the home, around the 
doors and \Vindows and for plaster falling front the ··ceiling 
in some of the rooms, contending that vibrations were caused 
by the heavy weight of the trucks and the heavy loads carried 
therein as they traversed the ground .:adjacent to ·appellants' 
hdme of such intensity . as ·to~ shake the ground upon \Vhich 
a'ppeUants' home is built: thereby causing. -s'aid cracks. A 
series of photographs, 'Of both the inside and the outside of ap-
pellants' home \Vere caused to be taken by" the_jrespondent and 
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were introduced at the trial as ,exhibits and are made a part 
of this record (Tr. pages 114 to 125). (Tr. page 156). 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellants rely upon the following errors:· 
Error No. 1 
The court erred in making and entering Conclusion of 
Law No. 1 to the effect that: 
C(The operations of the defendant, Utah Construction 
Company, jn hauling material along and upon 80th 
West Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, from the 1st 
day of August, 1948, and until the 1st day of March, 
1949, did not create or constitute a nuisance." 
Error No. 2 
The court erred in making and entering Conclusion of 
Law No. 2 to the effect that: 
"The operations of the defendant, Utah Construction 
Company, identified above, did not cause any physical 
damage to the real or personal property of the plain-
tiffs." 
Error No .. 3 
The court erred in making and entering Conclusion of 
Law No. 3 to the effect that the operations of the defendant, 
Utah Construction Company, as revealed by the evidence and 
identified in the Findings 
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~.\ .... did not cause the plaintiffs any legal' dan1age 
by reas9n of the annoyance and disturbance to, ·-the 
plaintiffs and the noise and dust incident upon the 
operation of said trucks, and the defendant had a 
lawful right to drive and operate said trucks upon 
and over _the -public , highway kqown as 80th West 
Street in the manner and to the extent that said trucks 
\\·ere operate9.' · : ...1 ,t~. 
Error No. 4 
The court erred in making and entering its judgment 
herein, and the whole thereof, to the effect that: 
nThe operations of the defendant alleged in plain-
~iffs' complaint have not caused the plaintiffs to suffer 
any damage to their property and have not caused any 
legal damage to the plaintiffs by . reason of ~he noise, 
vibration and dust incident to the . operation of said 
trucks and the operation thereof by the defendant 
was a legal and proper use of said public higlT\vay 
by said defendant and did not create or constitute a 
nuisance.'' 
Error No. 5 
The court erred in not entering its Findings, C9nclusions 
and Judgment to the effect that the operations of respondent, 
lJtah Construction Company, as shown by the evidence, created 
a nuisance to appellants injurious to their health, indecent 
and offensive to their sens~s, cr~ating an obstruction to the 
full use of their property so as . .to interfere \Vith the· com-
fortable enjoyment of life and property and avv-arding plain-
liff s datnages within the scope and meaning. of Section 1 04- 5 6-1, 
IJtah Code Annotated 1943. v~, n_~ ~, :: 
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ARGUMENT 
Errors. of Law Nos 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
These errors are directed to Conclusions of Law Nos. 
1, 2, 3 and to the Judgment, as entered, all of \vhich are to 
the .effect that even though respondent, Utah Construction 
Company, in its operations and use of 80th West Street in S~lt 
Lake County adjacent to the home and property of plaintiffs 
from .f1.ugust 1, 1948, continuously daily to March 1, 194-9, 
comn1encing at 5:00 o'clock A.M., and operating about fifteen 
large Euclid trucks at intervals of 21;2 minutes at a speed of 
20 miles per hour with a gross load of 42 tons, Continuously 
through the day and into the night hours to 11:00 o'clock 
P .lvL, except for one-half hour off at lunch, emitted strong_ 
and offensive fuel fumes, created clouds of dust scattered by 
air currents over premises of plaintiffs and infiltrating into 
the inside of plaintiffs' home covering furniture, clothing and 
~ettling over carpets, rugs and other household effects, and 
even entering the food and food supplies of plaintiffs, created 
loud and disturbing noises and shook through vibrations of 
speed and the heavy loads the ground surrounding and under-
neath plaintiffs' home, still as a matter of law no nuisance was 
created to plaintiffs and no actionable nuisance thereby existed 
or arose and respondent, Utah Construction Company, \VJS 
·within its lawful rights in such use of $aid highway. 
For this reason, these errors will be treated~ considered 
and argued· together. 
. No material, factualtnatter is in dispute except the physical 
effect the respondent's use of the highway has had upon the 
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plaintiffs' house occupied as their dwelling. Plaintiffs contend 
the vibrations to the adjacent gro~nd upon \Vl1ich said d~~lling 
rests caused by the continuous pounding of the highway \vith 
heavy loads of earth material used in 'the construction· of said 
dike teslilted in increasing and expanding cracks already exist~ 
ing in the foundation ahd walls of said dwelling and bet\veen 
the walls arid fou.ndatioh alleged to have· been originally 
caused by respondent's use of said highw':ly· by· similar heavy 
tnachinery and heavy loads some three years before the instant 
case was comtnenced and for which a settlement of $3,000;00 
was made without joining issue or going to trial (Tr.· 32-33). 
Respondent contends the expansion and enlargement of ·such 
cracks and moving out of line of the original construction is 
the result of the natural settling and sinking of the foundation 
and has been caused by the natural elen1ents ·and passing' of 
years. Contractors or builders were sworn and testified ex~ 
pertly regarding the effect of such vibrations on the dwelling. 
Witness Peck sworn on behalf of plaintiffs (appellants ;.here), 
definitely attributed the expanding cracks in ·the walls and 
foundation to vibrations caused by said Eutlids· (Tr. 50-62 ). 
Witness Paulson, superintendent of respondent, Utah Con-
~truction Company, testified that vibrations caused by the 
passing trucks did no damage to the house {Tr. 150-152). 
Witness Percival Young, general contractor, sworn on behalf 
of respondent, testified that vibrations caused by· locomotives 
2nd freight trains vvould have no effect at all on adjacent build-
~ .~', ") ·, ~ ' _:.-I . ', ,: _:, ...... C.~~_· ~· ~, •. :. ..··/ - , ~· . ~. --~- -:· .:._ ~ ,· '.. '. r " './ •: •. •.' :." ' .. ~ ';'. .• ,.- •' 
ings, (Tr. 180), but admitted he was not' _qu~lified to tal~ .. on 
~- --·~ :· ·. ;''• ' . . : ~· ; ,' -, ; .: ·:~:> ' h. '. ( ~ { 
vibrations (Tr. 189). And witness Hogan, University of Utah 
Engi~1eering Professor,. ·employed by responqent ;to n1ake a 
seismometer and sound level :tests_ of .the effect of the)_use of 
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the Euclidsnin~the area ·in·.question, made tests ~both ·upon the 
high,vay and adjacent to the ·highway, also within' the ,home of 
. th'e. plaintiff~; co.mparis~ns .'Y7're .· ~~4~'-, b~t~een ,the mean 
. ;~.ver~ges of vibration. measurements.{ .of!, q~heJ; vehicles using 
the·~ highway; ) including light passenger cars, small trucks, 
heavier trucks such as P.I.E. etc.,_ ap.cl tqe l9aded ~ll:c;lids (Tr. 
, ih3-2.14). . The 1 r~~~its iof. the1~ ·'\~~~-s: ii~J signific~~t :at1d defj-
, _: '--: ;;.~-.~: . . ; •.. ; ' '. ' . . . • . l. 
nitely establish the fact that the· loaded Eucllds created an 
. exf~a-cirdinary 'use of the highway and created vibrations in 
t~nhs of increased decibels much in excess of the ordinary 
traffic. 
. That the respondent's operations created dust, fumes and 
smoke adjacent to and in, around and upon plaintiffs' dwelling 
is not controverted, neither does respondent deny that the 
bperatidh of said Euclids caused loud and disturbing noises, 
interfering with the peace and quiet of plaintiffs' home and 
the ·comfortable ertjoyment thereof. Admitting all these ele-
r11ents ·:the sole issue which divides the parties is whether as 
it ·in.att~r ··of law such ·acts and operations of the respondent 
·create an actionable nuisance to plaintiffs for which respondent 
should respond in damages. 
Let us now look to the statute above referred to and to :~ j• , ,. ,' ' r •' r , ' , '; •• , ~ 
~4e per~~n~nt e~pressions of this court in cases brought under 
said statute. 
·,··: '·,, ·• i. .. -,. ': 
1 
.iOJq, Section 104-56-l, · Utah Code Annotated 1943, covers 
actions for nuisance such ·as the .instant. cases and· 'reads: 
. i :.-.. :· ... ~ - l ,\~ • 
. ' ... c.cf\t:Iythipg ~r!~lt- i~ inj~rio~s to. h.e,altl), or i,n~~¢e9t, 
' or offe'nsi~l'e to 'the senses·, or! an obstiiictlon 'to the free 
use of property, so as to interfere·' vvith the comfortable 
10 
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enjoyn1ent of life or· property, is ~a· nuisance anJ the 
subject of an action. Such action n1ay -be brought 
by any person \vhose, property is inju.riously ~ffected, 
or whose personal enjoyment is lessened 'by the 
·nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance· rnay-· be 
enjoined or abated, and dat:nages n1ay also,be recovered. 
~ .• ~ .- ~ ) ' ~ ~ .' ~-i ~~ . . - - - •' . . . ~ .. : -~· :· ~-: .'. \l s ~-~- >. ~ 
- In Dahl vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, 71 U. ~, 2()2 
~;_~- :. ··:~ ·.,·~~_;,·~ .' - ·- .. < ~ . . ·'' \ .1· .•• ~-. 
Pac. 269, this cotitt declared that what constitutes an actionable 
nuisance in law under the statute cited is always a question 
of degree. And the test of whether the use of the prop~.rty 
(Onstitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use. com-
plained of in the particular locality and in the n1anner and 
under the circun1stances of the case, citing 29 Cyc. 1156. 
t«The right to recover demages for injuri~s occasioned by 
fumes, dust, smoke, foul air, etc., being cast upon ope's prop-
erty by another, in proper cases, is well establi~hed. B\lt the 
rule of liability i.s not absolute and the law _does not afford 
redress for every such discomfort or -~nnoy~nce. _ Extrem~ 
rights in this regard cannot be enfor~ed:: Of ~necessity sorne 
degree of inconvenience and annoyance m.u~t be endured or 
community and social life would be impos~ible. _,It thus foll?w,:.s 
that what constitutes in law an actionable nuisance is always 
~~ question of degree. The cases cited and relied·-orf by the 
plaintiff are instances where, under all ·the -. circumstance~, 
rhe use of the property complained of was held unreasonable . 
. Here, wher_e the facts ·an<l _circumstances, both with ,r._espect 
to the origin ,and. nature, of 'the cthing complained of and the 
degree of its offense, differ essentially from those of the 
l:i,~dcited, ~~ hav~.:~n:. ~ntirely differeflt legai questi?n." Ex-
.. • ' . .. ' ' . _, .... i.. - . -' - .. 
cerpt from D;ahl ;C.<;J.SC supra. 
1 1 
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The Jo!lowing is cited with approval in the. Dahl case: 
·. ,-; j.J ~ ' '- ~ J: tf ~; . ,I.: 
t.l/h~ <~~ ·:~v~at :an1ount of an,11oyance or ,ip.conveniepc~ caused 
~)n~) by others in the. lawful use of th~ir property wiil con-
<u ; stiiute a nuisance,,is ~arg'ely a questipn of d~gree de-
'i.· .... ... : , pending an ~varying circumstances, and is . incapable 
1dJ · trf of exact definition. (Citing cases).. The injury or 
rj(H .: annoyance must be . of a real and substantial nature, 
lO ·:J'ln and the pertinent inquiry ordinarily· is \vhether the 
·· r:;~, acts or conduct proved are such as materially to inter-
.:;· fere with the ordinary comfort, physically, of human 
existence, or are materially detrimental to the reason-
able use, or value of the property (citing cases.)" 
-Cumberland Corporation vs. Metropoulos, 241 
Mass. 491, 135 N. E. 693. 
, The principles laid down in the Dahl case supra fairly 
reflect the ~eight of authority where the basis for liability 
applicable in private nuisance cases is concerned. 
In 39 American Jurisprudence, Page 296, Section 16, the 
general rule. is stated· as follows: 
· .. , .. ''While, as a general proposition, a man may do what 
·. ; he vvill with his O\vn, this right is subordinate to 
another; which finds expression in the fan1iliar rnaxim 
·-~ • ~sic utere tuo ut alien urn non laedas,' which, it has been 
. ;~·~ said, is peculiarly applicable in nuisance cases. Gen-
:;tr:~c,, . erally, a .person has a right to use his own property for 
-no:~L·:·, any lav{ful purpose; provided he does not thereby 
. cH>) deprive others of any right of enjoyment of their 
·.r~)dJ(' property· which is recognized and protected by law 
, -.,r1 G.I ·. and his use is not such a one :as the law ~\vill pronounce 
a nuisance .. :For annoy4.nce and injury-,vhich _are merely 
consequen~ial on the !egitimate use of the property, the 
.::J)ru.;;.1)avv of nu1sance furntshes no redress, and the injury is 
·j~!.JJ>'-,':r.Dda~num:J 1 ~psql:e _i~j~ria .. 
12 
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The precise limits of one's right to do as he pleases 
\Yith his own property are difficult to define. The use 
must be a reasonable one, and the right itnplies and 
is subject to a like right in every other person. One 
cannot use his property so as to cause a physical in·· 
vasion of another person's property, or unreasonably to 
deprive hin1 of the lawful use and enJoyn1ent of the 
same, or so as to create a nuisance to ad joining prop-
erty owners or the public, and any unreasonable or 
unla,vful use \vhich produces material injury or great 
annoyance to others, or unreasonably interferes \vith 
their lawful use and enjoyment of their property, is 
a nuisance which n1ay be enjoined and will render 
him liable for the consequent damage. 
What is a reasonable use and whether a particular 
use is a nuisance cannot be determined by any fixed 
general rules, but depend upon the facts of each par-
ticular case, such as location, character of the neighbor-
hood, nature of the use, extent and frequency of the· 
injury, the effect upon the enjoyment of life, health 
and property and the like. A use of property in one 
locality and under some circumstances may be lawful 
and reasonable, which under other circumstances 
would be unlawful, unreasonable, and a nuisance. It 
has been held that what is a reasonable use of property 
is sometimes a question of law and at others a question 
of fact, and that when it depends upon an inference 
from peculiar, numerous or complicated circun1stances, 
it is usually a guestion of fact. And according to son1e 
authorities, the question of what constitutes unreason-
able and unlawful use of premises, and of what con-
stitutes an unlawful and unreasonable injury to other 
property arising from such use, are questions of .lav;, 
and cannot be submitted to the jury. 
A business which is lawful in itself tna y become a nuisance, 
either because of the locality in which it is carried on or because 
13 
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It is. conducted in an improper manner. . According to some 
Jf~. the courts, such a business m·ay, under some cireuli1stances, 
~v~~' become a 11{i!~t~nce per se, althdugh .. the weigh~.?£ ··authority 
is ~o thecontrary .. S~e 39 .(\merican J~risprl.ldence 323, Section 
43. ' ' 
j J. ' 
··~ 
.:ncnJ Jrv 
' :t ~, r\.{.1 (~ ·:~~ r~~. '.'NOISE AND VIBRA T.ION ' ' ' ,', I , ,. • r 
i ~ 1 · Section 4 7. Generally .-Generally, noise is not a 
nuisance per se, but it may be of such a character as 
· · to constittue a nuisance in fact, even though it arises 
from the operation of a factory, industrial plant, or 
other lawful. business or occupation. 
To render noise a nuisance, it must be of such a 
character as to be actual physical discomfort to persons 
of ordinary sensibilities." (Supported by long list of 
. cases, Footnote 19) .-39 Am. Jur. 330. 
A notable case among said authorities cited in the foot-
tJotes to' the above quoted rule is found in 102 Fed. 85, 50 
L:R.A. 488, Chicago G. W. R. Co. vs. M. E. Church. In that 
case there was involved the erection of a water tank in a public 
street 3 5 feet from a church, and of a passenger railway station 
60 feet therefron1, thereby enveloping the church in smoke and 
filling it with ·offensive odors and more or less smoke and 
cinders,· and· disturbing the congregation by the loud and in-
cessant noises caused by the blowing off of steam, the ringing 
Gf,.bells and sounding of whistles, and the backing ·of trains. 
The court held such· .acts·- constituted a· private .nuisance for 
\Vhich con1pensation must be made or the nuisance removed. 
) And under ·Section. 52, Page 3 3 5, Volume 39 An1erican 
Jurisprudence; :appears the following .statem.ent: 
14 
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ttJarring or vibration may an1ount to a nuisance 
\vhere it injures adjoining houses or interferes with 
the comfortable occupation or enjoyment thereof. 'fhus 
it has been held that an injunction will issue to restrain 
the operation of steam machinery \Vhich jars and shakes 
the complainant's house so as to render it unsafe or 
llnfit for habitation. It has been held, ho,vever, that 
an injunction "'ould not issue to restrain one from 
operating machinery in a lawful business on the ground 
that it shakes and cracks the walls of the plaintiffs 
adjoining house and diminishes their rental value, 
where it appeared that an adequate remedy existed 
in an action for damages, and that the plaintiff did 
not object to the erection of the machinery but sub-
mitted to its use for .seven years." 
One of the leading cases found in the footnote · ( 6) to 
the above statement is Stanley Kobielski and \vife, appellants, 
vs. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 22 Mich. 656, 193 N. W. 
214, involving the operation of a creamery turning out 2,500 
cases of milk per day in a residential district, separated from 
~ dwelling house only by a narrow alley, through which the 
Joading platform is reached, the operation of which, by noises 
of horses, cans and automobiles, and loud talking of men in 
the night, disturbs the sleeps of inmates of the dwelling to the 
injury of their health. The court held the acts to be a nuisance. 
In passing on the question the court used the following citation 
from 20 R. C. L. 445, which is directly in point with the instant 
case in relation to the night time use of the highway by· re-
:;pondent, to-wit: 
''The authorities are numerous which hold that noise 
alone, or noise accompanied by vibration, if it be of 
15 
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'' ': ,-. 
·such 'Character· as- to be. productive of actual-. d~s~ornfort 
and.anqoyance tQ a~person of ordinary sens1Bthty, may 
create ~;~l;li,s~qce, and, be t~e subject of an a~tlon,at .l.~;'Y.' 
ot'' an injunction from a courf of equity, though such 
'noise· and vibration ·may -~··result froril' ·the carrying on 
·of a trade or business in :a town: or. city. To. have·:this; 
effect the noise must be unreasonable .. in degree; an~. 
reasonableness in this respect is a question of fact, 
depending on th~ character .of the busin~ss, .the ~1anner 
. in which it is conducted, its location and relation to 
· other ·property, and the other facts and circumstances 
of the case. The number of people concerned by the 
nois·e, and the magnitude of the industry complained 
. of, 3:re both elements entitled to consideration in reach-
ing . a conclusion as to the fact. And, again, the time 
at' which noises are made is an element to be considered 
in determining whether a noise constitutes an actionable 
nuisance. A noise incident to the operation of 
machinery during the day may not be a nuisance, while 
.. th.~ same noise during the usual sleeping hours of the 
night would constitute a nuisance. And noises on Sun-
day may constitute a nuisance though they v;ould not 
.have been_ such if made on a "'reek day.'' (lJnderscoring 
mine). 
And see also .:Nlitchell vs. Flynn Dairy Company ( Io-vv·a) 
582, 151 N. W. 434, 154 N. W. 878. 
· ((That which would be permitted at one hour or 
·, ·· :· season may be restrained at another." 
b·)·J-:)h; -Stevens vs. Rockport Granite Company, 216 Mass. 
JBnoi·:· 4S6, \ J0-:4. N. ~··.: 3 71.. :<(sl:~n· ; _ -:. ::Jn ~)-· .· 
Thus, under the authorities cit~d hereir1 · \vhile' the re-
' 
spon?ent' s use of the highway in question during . the daylipht 
hours .·might ft~irr the: standpoint 'of fuel. fumes' '.dust sm~ke 
' ' ..: ,· -: '' : ', ; ' ' ',' -~ l,;_ ) 
16 
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and attendant noise of powerful diesel engines of 150 horse-
po"·er, carrying heavy loads over 2 to 3 minute intervals be 
'.vithin the la\Yful rights of respondent, still projecting such use 
into the late hours of the night \vhen plaintiffs \Vere entitled 
to an interval of rest from such annoyances \vould constitute 
an actionable nuisance. 
Considering the character and type of equipn1eht used 
by respondent, the time of day \Yhen the use commenced and 
the period of the day through which the use continued, the 
intervals between the vehicles as they proceeded to and frotn 
the dirt pits, the months through which the work continued 
without abatement, with all the attendant elements of annoy-
ance, the fuel gases emitted, the smoke and dust circulated 
into the air and settling constantly upon and within the dwell-
ing of plaintiffs, the noise and vibrations caused by the speed 
and excessive loads of the Euclids daily, eighteen hours each 
day, except the lunch hour, plaintiffs believe respondent's usc 
of the highway was unreasonable and unwarrantable. .A.l-
though injunction was not sought against respondent's manner 
\,f use of the highway and possibly would not lie in such usc, 
still under the authorities cited the use was extraordinary, 
out of the usual pattern of use even for the. heaviest of traffic 
and certainly applied at unreasonable hours of the night. No 
emergency justifying such use existed and plaintiffs should not 
be required to suffer as the evidence clearly showed they suffered 
without compensation therefor. See Lewis vs. Pingree National 
Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 Pac. 558. 
''There is no doubt of the general proposition that a, 
rrta.n may do what he will with his own, but this fight 
17 
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-· t:i=" .i. ·:' is subordinate to another,.\\' hich' finds expre~sion in. the. 
·/1 :u.t hix;' fatniliar maxim: Sic utere tuo ut alien urn non laedas. A 
. :~-.:r':?i!Y' landowner-'s rights, . says the lJnited ~States-~ _Supren1e 
Court, ·will not justify him in maintaining a nuisance, 
or in carrying on a business or trade that is offensive to 
his neighbors. Ever since Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57, it 
.t has been the settled law, both of this country and of 
~:, ~: nEngland, .that a man has no right to- maintain a structure 
upon his own land, which, by reason of disgusting 
smells, loud or unusual noises, thick stnoke, noxious 
vapors, the jarring of machinery or the unwarrantable 
collection of flies, renders the occupancy of adjoining 
property dangerous, intolerable or even uncomfortable 
to its tenants. No person maintaining such a nuisance 
can shelter himself behind the sanctity of private prop-
ty ' '' er . 
-20 R. C. L., Page 381, Section 2. 
Text supported by Camfield vs. United States, 167 lJ. S. 
518, 17 S. Ct. 864, 42 U.S. (L. ed.) 260. 
Assuredly, the $3,000.00 settlement made by respondent 
~vith plaintiffs (appellants) (Tr. 32-33), was not intended 
a5 and for a permanent and complete adjustment of a con 
tinuing nuisance which might recur over a period of years 1ntc 
the future, when viewed in the light of the 'vork ren1a1n111g 
to be done upon said dikes. 
Under the principles laid down tn the statute cited and 
the judicial interpretations thereof by this court and the 
~uthorities from other judisdictions cited herein, appellants 
respectfully subn1it the evidence presented to the tnal court 
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does not support the Findings, Conclusions and Decree ren-
dered in this cause, but on the contrary does justify a finding 
of actionable nuisance for which damages should· be a\varded . 
., 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
. Attorney for Appellants 
~ '" •• ' • j- • :~ :·: : :~ ~ 
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